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## STUDY PROJECT

### ARMY READINESS AND THE RESERVE ROUNDOUTS: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

BY

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United States Army

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## ABSTRACT

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The Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 was the first major conflict since the Total Force Policy became an integral part of our National Security Strategy in 1971. This conflict was the first large-scale mobilization of reserve forces since the Korean War. The lack of readiness of the 13,000 combat-arms soldiers activated from three of the four existing reserve "roundout" brigades became a troubling and controversial issue for the Army's leadership. New training strategies, known as BOLD SHIFT, were implemented in September 1991 to correct the readiness shortfalls that appeared during this mobilization. However, given the on-going reduction in force that will result in tomorrow's smaller, contingency-oriented Army, more than training reforms are needed to maximize the effectiveness of the roundout concept. This study identifies the other military factors, such as mobilization planning and force structure changes, as well as some of the political and legislative issues that must be addressed in light of the problems incurred in past mobilizations. Finally, this paper makes three specific recommendations that would enhance the Total Army's rapid-response capability in a future marked by global regional instability and shrinking defense budgets. The first recommendation is implementing the combat arms roundout concept at the battalion and/or company level. The second recommendation includes passing legislation that would extend the Presidential Call-up authority for reserve forces beyond the present 180 day limit. The final recommendation is increasing the number of reservists the President can activate in the absence of a national emergency beyond the present 200,000 limit.

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ARMY READINESS AND THE RESERVE ROUNDOUTS:  
A NEW PERSPECTIVE

by

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## INTRODUCTION

The Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 called into question the basic concept of the Total Army -- particularly, the idea of combat-ready reserve roundout brigades. Consequently, in light of radical changes at home and abroad, the nation is reworking the roundout concept to meet the new demands. The only certainty is that the roundout concept will continue to be an element in the U.S. Army.

This paper has several purposes. First is to review the reasons for establishing roundouts. Second is to consider conditions that create the contexts in which current and future force structures must exist and operate. Third is to review possible remedies to deficiencies in past reserve mobilizations, and to assess the adequacy of these proposals in the light of expected conditions. Last is to draw some conclusions and offer some recommendations about the likely value of roundout concept in future force planning.

### THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY: WHY ROUNDOUTS?

In 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird ordered the military to reduce their expenditures. He further ordered "reductions in the overall strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserve."<sup>1</sup>

The Army transition from the draft to the all-volunteer force in the early-1970's required an increased reliance on the Reserve and National Guard for rapid augmentation forces in time

of war or other national emergencies. This new policy became known as the "Total Force Policy" or "Total Force Concept."

In March 1974, Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams testified in a Congressional hearing of his plans to increase the Army's size from 13 1/3 active divisions in 1973 to ultimately 18 divisions in the mid-1980's without increasing the 780,000 manpower strength. This decision was made for two primary reasons: first, to insure that the Army could accomplish the national security strategy without reliance on nuclear weapons and secondly, to establish such a reliance on the reserve forces that the active Army could not function without them. "They're not taking us to war again without calling up the reserves," Abrams is quoted as saying on many occasions.<sup>2</sup>

The Army activated three additional divisions immediately after the end of the Vietnam Conflict mainly because the political and military leadership was concerned about the growing expansionism of the Soviet Union. Leaders concluded that more combat divisions would increase deterrence of potential enemies and increase the confidence levels of our allies. Thus, potential conflict with the Soviet Union heavily influenced the creation of the roundout brigade concept.

These additional five active divisions were below full strength in peacetime and relied on their reserve components to bring them to full strength upon mobilization. Using reserve units to complete or "round out" active divisions made sense for several reasons. First savings would be realized by reducing

full-time manpower and equipment operating expenses. A second benefit would be the improved readiness and visibility of the reserve components. The Army's leadership determined that the reserves needed to realign missions and force structure. The result was the elimination of 19 of 27 Army National Guard divisions, and all six Army Reserve divisions. The result of this reorganization was a force structure that supported 21 separate reserve brigades and eight reserve divisions.<sup>3</sup>

The Total Force Policy evolved into the Total Army Policy during the last 20 years. In August 1990 the Army was forced to test this Total Army concept as it mobilized for Desert Shield and eventually Desert Storm. This was the first mobilization the Army had conducted since 1968 and the first under the Total Army concept.

#### **DOMESTIC ISSUES: A CHANGE OF FOCUS**

Americans today are more concerned with domestic problems than the threat of a nuclear confrontation with Russia or a conventional war with any other country. These concerns have led both President William J. Clinton and Congress to face some tough decisions that will affect the future of the armed forces as well as that of the nation during the next four years. Regardless of the changes that will eventually be implemented, one thing is certain. The reduction in force now affecting all branches of the military will continue as America's leadership reviews its national goals and priorities.



Reshaping the military is nothing new for the United States. The United States' political leadership made similar decisions following each of the two world wars and the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. The military was forced to rapidly demobilize its forces, slow equipment fielding and modernization programs, and develop force structures based on budget constraints.

By 1995, the United States Army including both the active and reserve components, will be the smallest it has been since 1939. This Army may be only the sixth largest Army in the world if the armies of the other leading nations are not severely reduced.<sup>4</sup> This projected reduction in force and the current changes in national military strategies threaten the effectiveness of the reserve roundout brigade concept. New alternatives must be explored and implemented.

#### **CHANGING THREATS AND STRATEGIES IN A NEW WORLD**

United States defense strategy has now shifted from a policy of Soviet containment and nuclear deterrence to a focus on global regional stability. The world has become more dangerous in some respects since 1990 with the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and dissolution of the Soviet Union. The economic instability and volatile political climates in many of the former Soviet republics continue to generate regional military conflicts.

During the Cold War military analysts believed that the greatest threat to U.S. conventional forces was clearly confrontation with the Soviet Union in Europe. Consequently, much of the Army's strategy, force structure, operational

methods, equipment and training was focused on defeating the Warsaw Pact on the plains of Europe.

The threat to the United States today has shifted from the Soviets to one that is ill-defined, regionally-based, and not subject to former Cold War policies of nuclear deterrence. Additionally, regional instability will grow if there is a spread of nuclear weapons to developing and emerging nations. The potential use of a nuclear device by a radical terrorist organization is a realistic threat and a major concern to America. Many regional forces will improve their conventional combat capabilities during the next decade by acquiring lethal, high-technology weapon systems.

The military's change in focus and defense strategy places a greater demand on the intelligence community to provide timely warning of threats to the national security interests and objectives. The 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment defined the real threat facing the United States as being caught unprepared to handle a crisis or war that no one had predicted or expected. The resultant challenge on the armed forces today is to be prepared to "respond rapidly, to deter, and, if necessary, to fight and win unilaterally or as part of a coalition."<sup>5</sup>

#### **FUTURE ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE DEBATES**

The core issue in the debate between our military and political leadership concerns the disappearance of the Soviet Union as our principal foe. Specifically, the question facing

the Army's leadership is: How should the Army's force structure be reorganized in light of the changing threat and strategies?

The military strategy to support the Cold War deterrence policy required a substantial number of American military personnel to be stationed abroad. These forward-deployed, forward-based forces were poised to fight attrition warfare until CONUS-based forces could deploy to reenforce units in specific theaters.

On 2 August 1990, President Bush announced a 25 percent "build-down" of the armed forces. This change was made after a thorough analysis of the Post-Cold War defense strategy developed to meet potential regional conflicts that might challenge U.S. interests. Ironically, 2 August was the same day Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.

This "build-down" over five years meant the Army would reduce its structure from 26 divisions (18 active and 10 reserve) to 18 divisions (12 active and 6 reserve) by 1995. This capabilities-centered, 18-division "Base Force" was considered by the Bush administration to be the minimum level force needed to meet the defense goals of our Post-Cold War military strategy.

Some Congressional critics argued that the military simply cut the force structure by 25 percent to fit a declining budget and was remiss in not developing a new structure based on the perceived threat. Representative Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, stated in his 4 February 1992 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, "It is critical to

identify the threats to U.S. interests that are sufficiently important that Americans would consider the use of force to secure them."<sup>6</sup> Based on his analysis of what was required to defeat the Iraqi military, Congressman Aspin proposed that the Army needed only fifteen total divisions, nine active and six reserve.

Whether the force structure should be designed according to capabilities desired or a projected threat scenario, both Bush's "Base Force" and Aspin's Option C proposal require four CONUS roundout brigades as part of the Army's total force structure.

#### **MOBILIZATION LESSONS REPEATED**

There are three main lessons the Army relearns after each mobilization. These lessons can be categorized into political decisionmaking, mobilization planning and post-mobilization training. Since the full mobilization of World War II, the United States has had four partial mobilizations. These occurred during the Korean conflict, the Berlin crisis of 1961, Vietnam conflict in 1968, and the Persian Gulf War in 1990.

At least some envision the Persian Gulf War as the prototype of regional conflicts to come. Major General Jerry A. White, Commandant of the Infantry Center and School stated in the October 1992 issue of Infantry Magazine, "Desert Storm taught us that it is unlikely that we will again have the luxury of a long build-up period before committing a force against an aggressor."<sup>7</sup> If so, what will be the consequences of building a

nine-division active Army with four heavy divisions, each rounded out with a reserve brigade?

Title 10, United States Code provides four major ways of making reserve forces available. These are accepting volunteers, partial mobilization, full mobilization, and Presidential Call-Up for operational missions. The first three options existed before our Total Force Policy. The last one, "Section 673b", was enacted in 1976 and is a key to the Persian Gulf crisis.

#### **Politics: A Calculated Cost**

Making reserves available to active forces is not trouble-free for several reasons. Before each call-up, the Congress and the President wrestle with political costs of mobilizing citizen soldiers. However, our Total Force Policy relies heavily on the reserve forces. Mobilization is an act of political will that sends strong signals to both our allies and foes alike. The real difficulty lies in getting the required manpower without creating domestic or diplomatic turmoil and dissension.

Volunteers pose little problem but provide only a small percentage of needed manpower. Partial mobilization allows for activating reserve units and individuals for up to 24 months during a time of national emergency declared by the President, or when authorized by law, but is limited to one million members of the Ready Reserve. Full mobilization requires Congress to determine that national security requirements exceed active component forces even for a prolonged period. Congress then

SELECTED FEATURES OF RECENT MOBILIZATIONS  
COMBAT ARMS UNITS

<u>FEATURES</u>	<u>WORLD WAR II</u>	<u>KOREA</u>	<u>BERLIN, 1961</u>	<u>VIETNAM, 1968</u>	<u>PERSIAN GULF</u>
SCOPE	M=D-15 MOS	M=D	NO HOSTILITIES	M=D+36 MOS	M=D+4 MOS
TOTAL MOBILIZATION	PARTIAL MOBILIZATION	PARTIAL MOBILIZATION	SMALL PARTIAL MOBILIZATION	SMALL PARTIAL MOBILIZATION	PARTIAL MOBILIZATIONS
MAJOR DEPLOYMENTS	MAJOR DEPLOYMENTS	NO MAJOR DEPLOYMENTS	NO MAJOR DEPLOYMENTS	NO MAJOR DEPLOYMENTS	MAJOR DEPLOYMENTS
MOBILIZATION SITUATION	THE FIRST COLUMN IS THE RESERVE COMPONENT COMBAT ARMS UNITS ACTIVATED THE SECOND COLUMN IS THE NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT UNITS ACTIVATED				
COMBAT UNITS	NONE/18 DIVS	NONE/8 DIVS	1 DIV/2 DIVS	1 BN/2 BNS	NONE/3 BDES
POST-MOBILIZATION SITUATION					
TRAINING REQUIREMENT	NONE/44	NONE/33	27/27	7/15	NONE/15

Figure 1

orders reserve components to active duty for as long as necessary. The Presidential Call-Up allows the activation of up to 200,000 reservists for no more than 180 days to augment operational missions without a declaration of a national emergency.

In all five mobilization cases mentioned above, the number of months between the mobilization day (M-Day) and the outbreak of hostilities (D-Day) was different. Mobilization for World War II was D-15 months, compared to the D+4 months to call up the reserve combat brigades for the Persian Gulf War.<sup>8</sup> Three factors seem to contribute to this difference. One is the political consensus the President requires for a mobilization. Second is the mobilization priority of units set by the Army. Third is the ability of the intelligence community to provide timely indications and warnings of possible situations that may call for our military involvement.

During World War II, the political objective was the survival of the nation. Before the onset of war, the Monroe Doctrine had forced the U.S. to examine its military capabilities in light of a growing external threat from Germany. Germany's invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 had forced the United States to examine its defense policies for the protection of both North and South America. Brazil then became the key focal point of our defense planning because of the growing Nazi political, economic and military influence in that country. The United States Army began to expand its forces, review its doctrine and

force structure, and broaden and intensify the training of its reserve forces.

On 30 July 1940, President Roosevelt decided to mobilize the reserves for one year of training. Congress approved the President's request on 26 August after exhausting debates and compromises but limited the call-up by adding a clause stating,

that the members and units of the reserve components...shall not be employed beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere except in the territories and possessions of the United States, including the Philippine Islands.<sup>9</sup>

Finally, on 11 December 1941, Germany declared war against the United States. Congress agreed that the survival of the nation was at stake and confirmed a state of war against Germany.

The first time American troops were sent into battle without Congressional authority occurred on 27 June 1950. President Harry Truman responded to a call from the United Nations and ordered forces to assist the South Koreans. At the conclusion of the conflict, the Congressional final report concluded "the United States should never again become involved in a war without the consent of the Congress."

There was no Congressional Declaration of War against North Vietnam when President Lyndon Johnson ordered American forces into the war in 1965. President Johnson made a decision not to mobilize for fear it would hurt his "Great Society" social programs. For eight years, Congress did not force the issue of whether President Johnson had exceeded his authority as Commander-in-Chief.



The Persian Gulf War mobilization is the other extreme of M-Day not equaling D-Day. Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. President Bush issued an Executive Order that day declaring a national emergency and stating that the invasion of Kuwait was a threat to the national security and foreign policy of the U.S. The President ordered U.S. forces to deploy to the region on 7 August. The 24th Infantry Division deployed to Southwest Asia on 13 August and the 1st Cavalry Division deployed on 11 September. The roundout brigades of these two divisions were not activated until 30 November and 7 December. Active separate brigades had to be substituted for the roundouts to bring active divisions to full strength.

President Bush risked his political future by ordering reserves to active duty without approval by Congress. The Presidential Call-Up occurred 22 August, nine days after the first active heavy division deployed. The President ordered 40,000 reservists to active duty, many of whom were immediately deployed to the Persian Gulf. At the height of the mobilization, 228,561 reservists were activated with 143,211 troops required to meet Army needs mainly in the combat support and combat service support areas. Finally, on 12 January 1991, Congress gave President Bush the authority to use military force against Iraq. The Senate vote was close -- 52 to 47, a one-vote margin.

Debates ensued between the Department of Defense's leadership and politicians as to why roundout units had not been

activated sooner and deployed with their parent units. One reason cited by the DOD was that:

the request for the full-strength heavy divisions was received [from CENTCOM] 16 days prior to the Presidential approval of reserve call-up authority on August 22, 1990.<sup>10</sup>

The FY 1991 DOD Appropriation Act was enacted on 5 November and included a section which authorized the President to order selected reserve combat units to active duty for a maximum of 360 days for the purpose of supporting Operation Desert Shield. This act placed extreme political pressure on the Army to activate the roundouts.

Finally, misconceptions about the utilization of the roundouts have contributed to mobilization delays for these units. As General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army told the 113th General Conference of the National Guard Association, in September 1991:

The roundouts originated to increase the strength of active divisions for major, protracted combat in Europe. They were not meant to be used as contingency forces for immediate, short-duration deployments.

In 1990, the Army had over 50 percent of combat forces and 67 percent of all combat support and combat service support units in the reserve force structure. The strength of the three roundout brigades activated was approximately 13,000 men -- less than six percent of the reserve forces called to active duty. Two points can be surmised. First, as the United States moves into a crisis situation, the services will be competing for their "fair share" of the 200,000 authorized for call-up. Second, the

Army's first priority for activation if deployment overseas is imminent must be combat support and combat service support units.

#### **Mobilization Planning: A Breakdown**

A review of all five past mobilizations clearly indicates that they were either not well-planned or that their planning was based on faulty assumptions. The main shortcomings noted were that mobilization planning during peacetime had generally been inadequate or detrimental. Frequently, planners neither took into account the reserve resources on hand nor had a realistic expectation of expansion requirements. In fact, mobilizing the reserves has always required more active duty forces and more supply stocks to bring the units to acceptable readiness levels than had been estimated.<sup>11</sup> Other deficiencies included poor administrative procedures resulting in critical unit and personnel data being inadequate.

Inadequate intelligence indications and warnings have contributed to faulty assumptions and plans. Four of the last five mobilizations began with an enemy surprise attack or action--namely, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the North Korean attack on South Korea, the Berlin Wall crisis, and the Iraqi attack on Kuwait. The adequate warning time prior to our involvement in World War II allowed the United States to partially mobilize and train reserve forces. The absence of key intelligence warnings of imminent attack by both the North Koreans and the Iraqis resulted in "come as you are wars."

### **The Training Paradox: Ready or Not?**

A common theme in all reports is that post-mobilization training took more time and resources than had been projected for each reserve combat unit to achieve a minimum readiness level. There are at least two reasons for this lack of training readiness.

First, inexperienced leaders and lack of critical specialists prevented rapid attainment of combat readiness. Large numbers of officers and soldiers were not branch-or specialty-qualified. In all five mobilizations, the activated combat arms units had to undergo a complete unit training program to achieve readiness standards to allow the unit to deploy.<sup>12</sup> As noted in Figure 1, training time required by reserve combat units to reach acceptable deployment standards ranged from 44 weeks during World War II to 16 weeks during the Persian Gulf War.<sup>13</sup>

The second point is that training time before activation had been inadequate. Larger units, such as brigades and divisions, required more training time and experienced leadership than smaller units, such as battalions and companies. The larger the military unit, the more time it generally took to train to a combat-ready level of proficiency.

The Congressional Research Services report on the roundout mobilizations of 1990 highlighted other problems, including inadequate expertise in field maintenance and administration as major training deficiencies of the roundout brigades. More

importantly, the report stated that there was "wholesale incompatibility of Active Army and Guard logistical and administrative equipment, management procedures, and automated information systems."<sup>14</sup>

General Gordon R. Sullivan in testimony before a House subcommittee stated:

...We know now that expectations were too high. First, we cannot achieve, in the limited training time available, an adequate level of training proficiency to be able to deploy high priority combat units in less than 60 to 90 days; divisions will take substantially longer. These conclusions are supported by Army findings and by research conducted by the Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office.

In response to questions in two other Congressional hearings, General Sullivan said that post-mobilization training time for roundout brigades would be 90 days and divisions would be about one year.<sup>15</sup> What has the Army done since the Persian Gulf War to minimize these deficiencies?

#### **BOLD SHIFT: THE SOLUTION?**

In seven months, a reserve roundout brigade reduced its estimated post-mobilization training time from 90 days to 55 days after conducting six months of BOLD SHIFT and a two-week Annual Training (AT). Why was this possible? What were the factors that contributed to the inadequate training of these roundout units before BOLD SHIFT?

For years the active Army sent Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to roundout units to conduct requested training. In most cases, active duty non-commissioned officers provided the training for

their reserve counterparts. These MTTs took the responsibility away from the reserve non-commissioned officer to prepare and conduct training.

When the reserve units deployed for their two-week Annual Training (AT), the non-commissioned officers were routinely not given the same responsibilities for the care and leadership of soldiers as were their active duty counterparts. The 1-R Annual Training Evaluations given the reserve units were often completed before sufficient training had been observed and were of little help to the reserve units in developing their training strategy for the next year. These readiness flaws were highlighted during the call-ups for the Persian Gulf War.

A training strategy was developed in September 1991 to improve reserve component readiness. Called BOLD SHIFT, the strategy consists of seven major programs. These programs focus mainly on leader, unit and soldier training. However, two programs direct the active and reserve counterpart units to jointly plan a training concept as well as provide active-duty officers and non-commissioned officers to the reserves on a full-time basis to assist in accomplishing higher readiness standards. The program initially focused on seven brigades, three battalions, and 75 company- or detachment-size reserve units throughout CONUS.

BOLD SHIFT is a year-round event with enhanced active component support during monthly training periods and at the two-week reserve Annual Training (AT) period. The training focus is

at the platoon level for combat units and at company level for combat support and combat service support units. The training approach is simple -- train to standard before progressing to the next task, certify the leaders evaluating the training, and perform individual tasks before collective tasks.

BOLD SHIFT is intended to improve Total Army combat readiness. The BOLD SHIFT operational readiness evaluations (OREs) are designed to evaluate battle readiness of reserve and active companies. These OREs were implemented to insure that a double standard of readiness did not exist between active and reserve units in evaluating a company's alert procedures, compliance with administrative regulations, collective training, and individual performance to the same standard.

In June 1992, the 116th Armor Brigade, a roundout to the 4th Infantry Division conducted its AT in accordance with BOLD SHIFT's new training guidelines. Planning between the brigade and division commanders and staffs began in December 1991. In January 1992, the division assigned an active duty officer to the reserve brigade headquarters to assist the unit in coordinating training and support requirements for the AT.

Between January and June 1992, approximately 650 soldiers in 102 mobile training teams from the division assisted the reserve brigade's units in Oregon, Nevada, and Idaho. These MTTs concentrated on reserve leader, soldier, and crew training.

Forces Command (FORSCOM) established Resident Training Detachments (RTDs) to assist the active division in sustainment

training of the reserves. The 116th Brigade's RTD consists of 23 officers, six warrant officers, and 13 non-commissioned officers assigned to 32 communities within three states. The RTDs' effectiveness cannot be evaluated until the brigade completes AT '93.

For the 116th Brigade, BOLD SHIFT/AT '92 was a success. Both the active and the reserve leadership received a better appreciation of the reserve unit's readiness. The reserve soldiers showed increased morale and a greater desire to learn. A by-product of this exercise was the training the active soldiers themselves received.

The results of the June 92 BOLD SHIFT/AT were revealing to both the active and reserve leadership. They served as a baseline for the development of a sustainment training plan for AT '93 and helped refine the unit's post-mobilization plan.

BOLD SHIFT/AT '92 was an active division's top priority for six months. Approximately 1000 soldiers, including a brigade, three battalions and 14 company commanders, were required as controllers/trainers to teach and mentor the reserve leaders during the two-week training. In a larger mobilization, the active soldiers required might not be available for training the roundout brigade because the active division might already be deployed or in the process of deploying.

The BOLD SHIFT initiatives are intended to improve active and reserve readiness and to enhance the Total Army's capability to go to war. This training and readiness approach is a giant



leap for the Total Army concept. However, are the changes in training strategies brought about by BOLD SHIFT really enough to insure that reserve roundout units will be combat-ready when needed?

#### **THE STUDIES: HAVE THEY BEEN HEEDDED?**

The controversy generated over the feasibility of the roundout concept and the active Army's relationship with the reserves began before the Persian Gulf War had ended. The October 1991 Congressional Research Service's report entitled "The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War " addressed the key issue: What should be done to change the roundout concept and its execution, given the problems with this concept that emerged during the Persian Gulf War?<sup>16</sup>

Research for the study was conducted between April and September 1991. Three major reforms were recommended. First, there must be more realistic expectations between both active and reserve components regarding what roundout units can do. Second, there must be more and better training, especially in leadership and command and control to roundout brigade personnel. Finally, pre-mobilization training requirements must be integrated with that planned for post-mobilization training. The report ends:

However, it remains to be demonstrated that the social, political, and organizational costs of such fundamental reforms would necessarily be worth the gains in roundout unit readiness they might bring about--or whether, in fact, such gains would even be realized.<sup>17</sup>

Many political and military leaders believe that these reforms will enable the roundout brigades to be ready for deployment more quickly than they were for the Persian Gulf War. However, other leaders state that more reforms are needed.

A second study was directed by Congress in 1992. This study required the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress "an assessment of a wide range of alternatives relating to the structure and mix of active and reserve forces appropriate for carrying out assigned missions in the mid-to-late 1990's." This directive came about mainly because 187,000 fewer reservists were requested by DOD for FY 1997 than Congress had authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. The largest cut was in the Army's structure, for which DOD had requested 154,280 fewer reservists.

This study, "Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense" became known as the "RAND Report" because it was conducted by RAND'S National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center that is independent of the military departments. Among other tasks, the study aimed at designing and evaluating alternative force structures based on our National Military Strategy, cost-effectiveness and political criteria that reserve combat forces should be included early in any deployment to insure the support of the American people.

An important point is that the Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1994-1999 (DPG) contained the planning scenarios that were used by RAND in developing their force structure analysis. The RAND report makes some key statements about the scenarios and assumptions of the DPG. The key points stated are:

...In some cases, delays of one or two weeks in mobilizing and deploying U.S. forces can quickly drive the Initial Response Force requirement above the ability of U.S. lift to deliver...(Also) the planning scenarios in the DPG were based on conservative, not worst case, assumptions...they do assume reasonably prompt national decisions to mobilize and deploy the force...the critical decision concerning use of reserve combat forces is when to start offensive operations--that is, when the Decisive Force will be committed to battle...the Decisive Force must be deployed as soon as possible and should not wait until reserve combat units can be ready."<sup>18</sup>

In other words, as soon as the indicators and intelligence are clear that regional stability is threatened, the President must immediately consider mobilizing the reserves if we are to have the combat service and service support units available to deploy the Initial Response Force and have a minimum of 90 days to train the roundout brigades and deploy them as part of the Decisive Force package.

The study compared and assessed alternative force structures needed to carry out expected future military missions at a range of manning and funding levels. Four force structures were examined that were within the Bush administration's existing budget levels and two alternative structures were examined that were at reduced funding levels. The "Base Force" and the

National Guard Association's alternative were within the budget level while Congressman Aspin's Option C was within the reduced budget level alternative.

With the change of presidential administrations in January 1993 and the emphasis on domestic concerns, the political leaders will probably continue to downsize the military force structure to the Aspin Option C level. The RAND report examined two structures at this anticipated funding level.

The Aspin proposal employs four roundout brigades with the CONUS early reinforcement forces/decisive response force. This alternative has a large proportion of its force structure in the reserves and provides no means to train them quickly enough to be used in a contingency.

The RAND analysis was based on two simultaneous major contingencies: one in Southwest Asia and the other in Korea. The analysis concluded that the Aspin Option C:

fails to generate a decisive force for the first contingency, and provides forces for a possible second contingency so slowly that there is likely to be a significant delay in providing an adequate force for either deterrence or defense in that theater.<sup>19</sup>

Staying within the projected reduced budget levels, RAND developed an alternative to the Aspin Option C force structure. This Alternative "K" force structure calls for ten active and six reserve divisions. However, instead of roundout brigades, the four active divisions would have roundout companies or battalions. The post-mobilization training time required to train roundout companies or battalions is considerably less than

that for brigades. In addition, a reserve "roundup", or fourth brigade in each division, would be part of the decisive response force and would provide the Army with greater flexibility and a greater decisive force. This Alternative "K" structure creates Training Commands which could simultaneously provide post-mobilization training for the roundup brigades and could become the cadre for strategic reserve divisions if required.<sup>20</sup>

Although this Alternative "K" structure allows the military to respond to the major contingencies outlined in the DPG simultaneously, there appears to be little acceptance for either the company- or battalion-level roundup by the senior leaders in either the active Army or Reserves. The senior active Army leadership is concerned because it feels this lower-level roundup would disrupt peacetime training as well as diminish the combat power of the roundup divisions in the absence of a political decision to mobilize.

The senior Reserve leadership is concerned about professional development and promotion opportunities for their soldiers if a lower-level roundup concept is implemented. The leadership appears to reject this concept completely and faults the active Army for not making the brigade roundup work.<sup>21</sup>

A Reserve Army officer in the Army War College Class of 1993, in fulfillment of his Military Studies Program, surveyed his fellow students on their opinions of the reserve components. The survey was limited to the active Army officers in the class. One of the major findings was that many active officers doubt the

effectiveness of the roundout/roundup program. This skepticism was evidenced by answers to the question, "In your opinion, roundout/roundup is a good concept at which levels of organization?" Of the officers responding, 70 percent chose battalion level or lower, while only 18 percent chose brigade level. Only 10 percent replied that roundout was not a good concept at all.

These officers were asked to respond to the statement, "In your opinion, roundout/roundup, as currently conducted, works." Only 23% of the officers believed that it works while 55% responded that it does not work. As one officer stated:

I feel strongly that roundout battalions are the only viable option. Much easier to deploy and train-up Guard battalions ...unrealistic to expect Guard forces [Brigades] to sustain same level of readiness as like [Brigade] active component. (Army LTC, former battalion commander)

Why is there such a difference of opinion between the senior Army leadership and recent Army War College graduates over the concept of roundout at battalion and company levels versus brigade level?

### CONCLUSIONS

In the next four years, the focus for President Clinton will be on revitalizing the American economy. This translates into greater cuts in military spending than those proposed by former President Bush. These cuts will undoubtedly result in further reductions in the military's force structure. There will be more reliance on the reserve forces to provide capabilities deleted

from the active force. The challenge lies in reducing the force structure without creating the "hollow Army" of the 1970's since the Army plays such a vital role in providing for U.S. national security.

If the United States is perceived as something less than the supreme superpower and dominant force in world affairs, regional instability is likely to escalate. As a consequence, the U.S. will have difficulty enforcing its national security interests and objectives.

Since 1939, the United States has mobilized five times in order to have the forces to defend its interests. The lessons of each mobilization were essentially the same. The political process, mobilization planning and post-mobilization training requirements of the reserve combat units have contributed to delays in deployment to crisis areas.

Two key lessons emerged from the most recent mobilization. One lesson was that reserve combat support and combat service support units required minimum post-mobilization training prior to their deployment overseas. A second lesson learned was that the reserve combat arms units required more post-mobilization training than had been anticipated prior to their deployment. The readiness of these Army reserve combat units was one of the most controversial issues that emerged from the Persian Gulf War. Assuming that the Persian Gulf War is the prototype of regional conflicts to come, these lessons about reserve unit mobilizations

must be carefully examined as Congress and the Army face future decisions in strategy and force development.

Following the Persian Gulf War, the Army implemented a training and readiness strategy, BOLD SHIFT, to improve reserve and active component readiness. Even with the improvements envisioned with BOLD SHIFT, the roundout units, at best, would require between 90 to 128 days of post-mobilization training prior to deployment in a crisis situation.

The absence of a timely political decision to mobilize the reserves undercuts the active Army's reliance on the roundout brigades during periods of world crisis. In fact, during the Persian Gulf crisis, Congress approved the President's request to mobilize more than 200,000 reservists by only one vote.

Two Congressionally mandated studies concluded that the optimal roundout unit is at the company or battalion level rather than at brigade because it is easier and quicker to attain prescribed readiness standards at the lower levels. As an example of this recommended force structure, the four active roundout divisions would each be restructured with three brigades, each having two active battalions and a roundout battalion from a reserve brigade. Each of these four active divisions would still consist of six active combat arms battalions. This force structure closely resembles the Marine Corps roundout system which worked well in the Persian Gulf War.

Given the resistance to change expressed by both active and reserve Army leadership, such radical reorganization is not



likely in the near future even with the projected downsizing of the active Army from 12 to 9 divisions.

The political links of the National Guard Association and Reserve Officers' Association with their states and with Congress are deeply-rooted and often self-serving. The reserve association's strong political lobby is united if it senses a challenge to its authority. This, more than any other factor, has caused the reserves to resist changes that are in the best interests of the Total Army. Our political and military leadership must be realistic in their expectations of reserve roundout combat units.

In the final analysis, the Army's active and reserve components can improve readiness through a refocus on training and mobilization planning. However, the tangible improvements to Total Army Readiness lie in a restructuring of the present roundout concept. The unknown variable for Total Army readiness lies in the political process involved in mobilizing reserve forces. If our political leadership delays or fails to act on mobilizing the reserves at the initial stages of a crisis, we will not have the decisive forces required to support our nation's strategic goals.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

To improve readiness and to insure the rapid response of tomorrow's Total Army, both military and political leaders need to examine ways of effecting changes such as the following:

- Implement the roundout concept at the battalion and/or company level to insure rapid deployment of CONUS-based forces and decisive victory in battle. After mobilization, the mission and functions of the reserve brigade commander and his staff would change in order to support the reconstitution and training of the strategic reserve forces.

- Extend beyond 180 days the maximum time period for Presidential Call-up of reserve troops. If up to 90 days is needed for post-mobilization training, activation of reserves up to nine months might be needed to insure the effectiveness of the roundout concept.

- Pass legislation increasing the number of reservists that the President may activate in the absence of a national emergency. The present 200,000-man limitation is too small considering current reductions in force. The dependence of the active military on the reserve forces will increase as these reductions slash the active strength in all the services. The Army's total strength will be close to its 1939 level.

The roundout concept is not only still feasible but is needed more than ever if our nation is to fulfill its defense goals while reducing the size of the active Army force. These recommendations will improve the Total Army concept.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>RAND's National Defense Research Institute, Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), xx.

<sup>2</sup>Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt (New York: Praegar, 1992), 364.

<sup>3</sup>Robert L Goldich, The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 1991), 5-6.

<sup>4</sup>Mike Kelly, Base Camp Briefs (George Washington Chapter: Association of United States Army, 1993), 1.

<sup>5</sup>George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: The White House, 1993), 15.

<sup>6</sup>Les Aspin, "Sizing and Shaping our New Conventional Forces -- A Threat-Driven Methodology" (Washington: Memorandum for the Adjutants General, 1992), 4.

<sup>7</sup>Jerry A. White, "Commandant's Note", Infantry (Ft. Benning, GA: U.S. Army Infantry Center and School, September-October 1992), 1-2.

<sup>8</sup>Goldich, 1.

<sup>9</sup>Robert Bruce Sligh, The National Guard and National Defense (New York: Praeger, 1992) 9-118.

<sup>10</sup>Goldich, 10.

<sup>11</sup>Sligh, 15.

<sup>12</sup>I. Heymont and E.W. McGregor, Review and Analysis of Recent Mobilizations and Deployments of the US Army Reserve Components (McLean, Va: Research Analysis Corporation, 1972), 1-9.

<sup>13</sup>Goldich, 14.

<sup>14</sup>Goldich, 22.

<sup>15</sup>"General Sullivan: Guard Divisional Postmobilization Training to be Lengthy," National Guard (April 1992): 4.

<sup>16</sup>Goldich, 2.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 51.

<sup>18</sup>RAND, XXVI.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 177.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 179.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 139.

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